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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY****3014536****TELETYPE INFORMATION REPORT**

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CLASSIFICATION

**S-E-C-R-E-T**

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OUT - DATE - TIME - GROUP

**30 OCTOBER 1956**

DISSEMINATION

**ROUTINE**

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COUNTRY

**EASTERN EUROPE/USSR**

SUBJECT

**DISCUSSION OF EAST EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE SOVIET POLICY**

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FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS BROUGHT OUT IN PANEL DISCUSSION ON CONSEQUENCES OF EAST EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS FOR FUTURE SOVIET POLICY AND KREMLIN POWER ALIGNMENTS.

1. FACT THAT CRISES OF CONTROL DEVELOPED IN BOTH HUNGARY AND POLAND (AND MAY DEVELOP IN OTHER SATELLITES) RESULT OF FACT THAT TO GUARANTEE THEIR OWN SECURITY AGAINST EACH OTHER KREMLIN LEADERS HAD TO CRIPPLE POWER OF SECRET POLICE APPARATUS. BUT LOSS OF SECRET POLICE TYPE CONTROLS OVER AND WITHIN SATELLITES PLUS LOSS OF THE TYPE OF PARTY CONTROL EXERCISED BY STALIN THROUGH HIS PERSONAL SECRETARIAT OVER HARD LINE FAITHFUL IN SATELLITE LEADERSHIP LEFT SATELLITES NO LONGER EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED.

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THIS PROCESS OF DEGRADATION, ONCE SET IN, COULD NOT BE HALTED BY ANY OF POSSIBLY EFFECTIVE METHODS.

2.3. SOVIET MILITARY, ALWAYS FAITHFUL TO PARTY IN POSTWAR PERIOD, PERMITTED ITSELF TO BE BADLY DISCREDITED IN BOTH POLAND AND HUNGARY. THREAT OF MASSIVE MILITARY INTERVENTION BACKED UP BY SPECTACLE OF FOURTEEN GENERALS AND MARSHALS ACCOMPANYING KHRUSHCHEV AND COMPANY TO WARSAW WITHERED IN FACE OF FIRMGESS OF POLISH LEADERS. POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT KHRUSHCHEV AND USSR MILITARY LEADERS MAY ACTUALLY HAVE EXPECTED SUCCESSFUL MILITARY COUP TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN POLAND BY TIME THEY ARRIVED. PLAN FOR ARREST OF SEVEN HUNDRED POLISH TEAM LEADERS AND CONSOLIDATION OF MATOLIN GROUP IN POWER WITH AID OF SOVIET MILITARY WAS FOILED ONLY AT LAST MOMENT. PATTERN OF ORIGIN OF SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY STILL NOT CLEAR BUT IT APPEARS INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY THAT IT WAS RESULT OF DELIBERATE DECISION IN MOSCOW. IF SUCH HAD BEEN CASE MORE COHERENT PLAN OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISPLAYED IN PAST FOUR OR FIVE DAYS. SOVIET TROOPS PERHAPS ACTED ON OWN INITIATIVE, PERHAPS WERE CALLED IN BY BATA OR GERO. MOST IMPORTANT FACT NOW IS THAT FRANTIC AND DISORDERLY INTERVENTION OF SOVIET MILITARY INTO HUNGARIAN SITUATION PLAYED IMPORTANT ROLE IN HARDENING HUNGARIAN REBEL AND PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST EXTREMISTS AND TO SOME DEGREE AGAINST ALL COMMUNISTS. WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES AT LEAST FROM BUDAPEST AND POSSIBLY FROM ALL HUNGARY IN WAKE OF WHAT CAN ONLY BE REGARDED AS DEFEAT FOR INTERVENTION FURTHER DD CREDITS SOVIET ARMED FORCES AS EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT OF CONTROL IN SATELLITES. THREE MAIN ARMS OF SOVIET CONTROL OF SATELLITES: PARTY APPARAT, SECRET POLICE, AND MILITARY HAVE ALL NOW SUFFERED SERIOUS BLOWS.

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